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1.  Introduction 
 
Services have emerged as the largest and fastest-growing sector globally in the last two 
decades. The sector contributes more than 60 per cent of global output and, in many 
countries, an even larger share of employment. This growth has also been accompanied by 
the rising share of services in world transactions, with services trade growing faster than 
goods trade in the period since 1990. There has also been a perceptible shift of FDI away 
from manufacturing towards services across the world. The share of services in total FDI 
stock in 2005 was around 61% compared to 49% in 1990 and only a quarter in the 70s. 
 
In line with this global trend, the services sector in India has also been witness to rapid 
growth, especially since the 1990s. In fact, this growth has now led to India becoming an 
“outlier” in terms of its services sector performance in the years since the turn of this century. 
Services contributed 52.6% of the country’s GDP in 2006, which is higher than the share for 
countries at a comparable level of per capita income as India; the sector employed 32% of the 
country's labour force in 2004. Services exports accounted for 38.4% of India’s total exports 
in 2006 (against 20% in 1990) and services trade was 15% of the country's GDP in the same 
year (up from 3.4% in 1990).  
 
India’s services growth has generated a lot of interest among academics and practitioners and 
there has been considerable research trying to explain the “services revolution” in the country 
(for e.g. see Hansda, 2002; Gordon & Gupta, 2003; Salgado, 2003; Banga, 2005; Verma, 
2006; Eichengreen & Gupta, 2010). However, the sustainability of services-led growth in 
India has been questioned (for e.g. see Mitra, 1988; Bhattacharya and Mitra, 1990 and 
Arunachalam & Kumar, 2002). In particular, the lack of a concomitant increase in services 
employment has been pointed to as the inability of this growth process to draw people away 
from agriculture with associated implications for income distribution and convergence.  
 
All these studies, however, look at the performance of services at the national level and to the 
best of our knowledge, there is not much literature exploring the services phenomenon at the 
sub-national or state level in India2. In this paper, we not only bridge this gap in research but 
also challenge existing literature by suggesting that services growth in India may be 
                                                 
2 Some work has been done by Wu Yanrui (2004), Deepita Chakravarty (2005) and Amin & Mattoo (2008). 
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equalizing in the long run. To substantiate our claim, we employ both standard growth 
regressions from the convergence literature and more recent panel unit root tests to find that 
per capita services are converging across India's states, even as per capita incomes are not. In 
further investigative empirical analysis, we not only find external demand to be an important 
determinant of services value added in a number of states, but also find this demand to 
emanate from all over the country, thereby suggesting that the benefits from services growth 
are being distributed more widely than is perceived to be the case. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section provides a snapshot of India’s 
state-level services performance as a starting point while Section 3 discusses why this is 
important in the context of results that suggest convergence in per capita services across the 
states. Sections 4 and 5 introduce and discuss the empirical model exploring the origin of 
demand for services at the state level. Section 6 discusses issues relevant for estimating our 
model while Section 7 looks at the results from estimation. Section 8 concludes.    
 
 
2.  How are India’s states doing in services? 
 
We begin by looking at the services3 performance of Indian states in terms of the sector’s 
contribution to value added, employment and the associated growth rates in Table 1.  
 
<Insert Table 1 here> 
 
At the outset, it may be worthwhile to point out that traditionally, 14 of the 28 Indian states 
have been regarded as “major” states based on their Gross State Domestic Product (GSDP), 
population, geographical size and location etc. These major states have been reported with an 
asterisk against their names in the tables in this paper. These states contribute 70 and 87% of 
India’s GDP and population, respectively, which also means that hypotheses and results for 
the major states would also be broadly applicable to the whole of India. This is especially 
                                                 
3 In terms of definition, the sector includes construction; utilities (electricity, gas and water supply); transport, 
storage and communication; trade; hotels & restaurants; financial services; real estate and business services; 
public administration; and community, social and personal services.  
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useful from a research perspective as data is not always readily available over a longer time 
period for the non-major states4.     
 
Table 1 makes for a few interesting observations: 
 
- Firstly, the importance of the services sector in GSDP across most Indian states (Services 
contribute at least half of the state domestic product in both the largest and the smallest states; 
the latter have also witnessed the highest growth rates in real services value-added)  
 
- Secondly, the relative less importance of services share in employment across Indian states 
especially for the major as well as the services-intensive GSDP states (in fact the biggest 
services employers are the non-largest states) 
 
- Thirdly, the growing importance of services overtime both in terms of GSDP and 
employment 
 
- Fourthly, the growing importance of services overtime for the BIMARU5 states in general 
and Bihar in particular over the last decade, especially in GSDP and to a lesser extent in 
employment        
 
- Fifthly, the top ten richest states (in terms of real per capita income or PCY) also have a 
higher share of services in GSDP and employment than the rest of the country 
 
We next consider a more disaggregated analysis of services contribution to GSDP and 
employment across Indian states by sectors for the period 2000-07 by looking at percentage 
shares and growth rates in Table 2. To enable this analysis, we group the states into four 
categories: one, high PCY large states (MH, KR, TN, AP, KN, GJ, WB); two, low PCY large 
states (BH, UP, MP, RJ, OR); three, high PCY medium-sized states (PJ, HR); and four, non-
major states. 
<Insert Table 2 here> 
                                                 
4 These include the “seven sisters” from the North East (Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, 
Mizoram, Nagaland and Tripura), the small states of Jammu & Kashmir, Goa, Sikkim and Himachal Pradesh, 
and the newly formed states of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Uttaranchal (which were hived off from MP, Bihar 
and UP, respectively, in 2000-01). 
5 This is a collective term given to the historically poorly-performing states of Bihar, MP, Rajasthan and UP.   
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In general, trade, hotels and restaurants; real estate and business; and construction services 
have been the traditional big contributors to services value added overtime across the 
majority of Indian states, so the structure has been fairly similar across space and time.  The 
90s witnessed the importance of banking and insurance while communication services have 
gained significance in the years since 2000.  
 
If we look at the percentage shares of services value added in Table 2, we see that (apart from 
CH, JH and PJ) services contribute at least half of the GSDP in each state, irrespective of the 
level of per capita income, but there are sectoral fluctuations across states. For instance, 
mostly non-major states exhibit more than average shares in construction and utilities. Most 
of the high PCY large states show greater than average shares in communication; trade, 
hotels & restaurants; real estate and business; and financial services. The low PCY large 
states, on the other hand, have above average shares in transport and trading services, the 
latter being true of PJ & HR as well. Thus, there seems to be a clear demarcation with 
transport services especially railways driving demand in low income states; the higher 
income states focusing on communication, financial and other business services; and trade, 
hotels & restaurant services showing importance across the board. 
 
If we consider growth rates of services value added next and study states and sectors on the 
basis of “above” and “below” average growth rates, we see that, with the exception of other 
transport and real estate and business services where the low and high income states, 
respectively, show above-average growth, the four-fold classification of states by PCY and 
size does not work as well. For instance, in the case of construction services, UP, RJ as well 
as MH, WB have experienced above-average growth. In the case of communication and 
financial services, both UP, OR and the high income states show above- average growth 
rates. Trading, hotel and restaurant services show UP, BH as well as the high income states 
with above-average growth rates. Thus, interestingly, when it comes to growth rates, one or 
the other low income state seem to be “catching-up” with the high income states across sub-
sectors. 
 
The disaggregated analysis of services contribution to employment across Indian states for 
the period post-2000 suggests that sectorally, trade/distribution, hotel & restaurants and 
community, social and personal services have accounted for almost two-thirds of all 
workforce employed in services and the structure has been fairly similar across all states. 
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Construction and transport, storage and communication services come next but the pecking 
order between them has varied across states. We also see a lot more variation in the share of 
services in total employment across states compared to that in value added. Also, sectoral 
variations in employment exist across states; sectors like utilities for instance employ very 
few people in all states. While no single sector emerges as an above-average employer across 
the low income states, transport, storage and communications; distribution, hotels and 
restaurants; and financial services show up as above-average employers across the high 
income states. In fact, all sectors are above-average employers in PJ and HR. For the non-
major states, the big employers are construction, utilities, trading and community, social and 
personal services. 
 
3.  Does it matter? (Yes it does, read the services convergence story.) 
 
The preceding section suggests that the states are performing well in services and while there 
are sectoral patterns in services demand and employment, growth itself is not restricted to 
particular states or sectors. But does this really matter? As mentioned above, the 
sustainability of services growth in India has been questioned in the literature; in particular, 
the services growth process is argued to have negative implications for income distribution 
and convergence. 
 
We reviewed the literature studying income convergence across Indian states and found that 
accounting for differences in methodology, coverage of states and sample size, most studies 
have found significant income divergence across India’s states [Nair (1971), Gupta (1973), 
Chaudhury (1974), Majumdar & Kapoor (1980), Sarkar (1994), Dholakia (1994), Bajpai & 
Sachs (1996), Marjit & Mitra (1996), Ghosh et. al. (1998), Rao, Shand & Kalirajan (1999), 
Dasgupta et. al. (2000), Kurian (2000), Aiyar (2001), Nagaraj et. al. (2002), Sachs et. al. 
(2002), Bandyopadhyay (2003), Gunji & Nikaido (2004), Kocchar et. al. (2006), Kar & 
Sakthivel (2007), Misra (2007), Kalra & Sodsriwiboon (2010)]6. However, with the 
exception of Dasgupta et. al. (2000) and Kar & Sakthivel7 (2007), none of these studies has 
                                                 
6 A few have however documented the presence of conditional convergence [Aiyar (2001), Nagaraj et. al. 
(2002), Kocchar et. al. (2006), Purfield (2006), Misra (2007), Kalra & Sodsriwiboon (2010)]. Cashin & Sahay 
(1996) found absolute convergence but their results lacked statistical significance. 
7 Their analysis does not cover the period since 2000 and the authors show that regional inequality went up in 
the 90s largely due to the rising inequality of industry and services in the period.  
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looked at the sectoral pattern of GDP. Is it possible that any particular sector may in fact be 
showing evidence of convergence?  
 
Using traditional measures of sigma- and beta-convergence from growth literature (Barro & 
Sala-i-Martin, 1992, 1995), we tested our data for the presence of absolute convergence 
across the 14 major states8 and as in the findings above, confirmed the absence of 
unconditional income convergence. However, interestingly, when we replicated this analysis 
at the sectoral level, we found evidence of absolute convergence in per capita services across 
the 14 major states. 
 
The estimated β-convergence for per capita services value added for the 14 major states was -
0.0096 (‘t’ statistic = -1.69) over the period 1980-2006 and -0.016 (‘t’ statistic = -1.93) over 
the period 1990-20069. Similar estimates of β-convergence for per capita income, albeit 
negative, did not report statistical significance over these time periods.     
 
To calculate sigma-convergence in per capita services value added, we first computed the 
standard deviation in per capita services value added across states for each year and then 
estimated the trend in this standard deviation overtime. Looking at the major states again, we 
found the estimated trend to be -0.00003 over 1980-200610 (‘t’ statistic = -0.03) and -0.005 
over 1990-200611 (‘t’ statistic = -1.98). Per capita income, on the other hand, exhibited 
sigma-divergence and statistically insignificant sigma-convergence, respectively, over these 
time periods. 
 
Recent empirical literature, however, has criticised the use of traditional growth regressions 
in studying convergence [Friedman (1992), Quah (1993), Evans & Karras (1996), Evans 
(1998), Temple (1999)] and advocated instead the use of non-stationary panel data 
econometrics [Quah (1994), Bernard & Jones (1996), Evans & Karras (1996)]. The latter 
consider the following data generating process: 
                                                 
8 It is standard practice in this empirical literature to test for convergence across the major states as they account 
for a substantial share both of India's population and GDP.  
9 Sectorally, Indian agriculture also showed beta-convergence but only during 1990-2006; Indian industry 
showed divergence over both these time periods. 
10 Indian agriculture and industry both exhibited statistically insignificant sigma-convergence. 
11 Indian agriculture and industry also exhibited sigma-convergence. 
 
 
9
it
p
j
jtiijtiiit xxx   


1
,1,  
where   and εit is IID with mean = 0.      
i
ititit yNyx log)/1(log
The null hypothesis is H0: ρ=0, that is, all time series are random walks. Under the 
alternative, it is assumed that all the time series are stationary with H1: ρ<0. If the null of unit 
root is rejected, then xit would be mean reverting and any deviations from the cross-sectional 
average would diminish over time; hence the yit series would be converging12. On the other 
hand, if the unit root tests fail to reject the null hypothesis, then the evidence suggests that 
these deviations follow random paths thereby rejecting the convergence hypothesis. In a 
similar vein, we also decided to use panel unit root tests to test for convergence in per capita 
services. 
 
Recent studies by O'Connell (1998) and Breitung and Das (2005) have highlighted that, in the 
presence of contemporaneous correlation, standard panel unit root tests like those proposed 
by Maddala and Wu (1999); Levin et al. (2002) and Im et al. (2003) suffer from severe 
oversize problem. We thus decided first to test our series for cross-sectional dependence and 
then decided to test them for convergence using different techniques from the literature 
suitable for our data and sample size. 
 
Using the Modified Lagrange Multiplier test for cross-sectional dependence in Pesaran 
(2004), we found xit defined on per capita services to be cross-sectionally dependent. The 
estimated test statistic was 2.65 for the 14 major states over 1980-2006 (p value = 0.0079; 
average absolute correlation = 0.372) and 5.77 (p value = 0.0000; average absolute 
correlation = 0.615) over 1990-200613.  
 
If cross-sectional dependence is weak, literature suggests using robust panel unit root tests 
such as the one proposed by Breitung & Das (2005). However, if cross-sectional dependence 
is strong, estimation requires decomposing the time series into common and idiosyncratic 
factors and testing them separately for the presence of unit roots (for e.g. Bai & Ng, 2004). 
                                                 
12 In addition, if μi = 0 then this convergence would be absolute.  
13 Similar results for xit defined on per capita income did not report statistically significant cross-sectional 
dependence. 
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Unfortunately, however, there seems to be no consensus in literature on the definition of 
weak or strong dependence (Sarafidis & Wansbeek, 2010)14. 
 
In view of the above, the first method used to test for unit roots was the panel unit root test 
suggested by Breitung & Das (2005) which is robust to weak cross-sectional dependence and 
also has power for small samples; this supported convergence in xit defined on per capita 
services but not on per capita income [the test statistic λ* for the 14 major states over 1980-
2006 was -1.895 (p value = 0.029) and -1.24 (p value = 0.108) over 1990-2006; similar 
results for xit defined on per capita income lacked statistical significance]. 
 
Under the assumption of strong cross-sectional dependence, we next decided to estimate one 
common factor in xit defined on each of per capita income and per capita services using 
principal components analysis on their standardized first differences in line with the 
procedure outlined in Bai & Ng (2004)15. As Bai & Ng (2004) have further shown, the 
common factor estimated using principal components analysis and the idiosyncratic errors 
follow the standard Dickey-Fuller (DF) test (with and without intercept, respectively) under 
the null of unit root. We found both the common factor and the idiosyncratic error to 
conclusively reject the null of unit root in each case, irrespective of state coverage and sample 
size, thereby validating the convergence hypothesis. These results are reported in Annex 
Table A1.     
 
However, in small samples with N and/or T less than 20, such as ours, it is difficult to 
estimate the common factors and the number of factors accurately (Bai & Ng, 2004; Sul, 
2009). We thus decided next to use the cross-sectional demeaned version of the IPS test 
(CIPS) suggested by Pesaran (2005) which accounts for the dynamics in the common factor 
by using cross-sectional averages and their lagged values (without having to estimate the 
common factor first); the unit root test is based on the t-ratio of the OLS estimate of βi in the 
cross-sectionally augmented DF regression (CADF) below:   
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14 Pesaran (2005) considers an average correlation coefficient of 0.6 in the cross-section errors in his empirical 
investigations (op.cit. pp 25) as indicative of strong cross-sectional dependence. In comparison, our panel of 14 
major states over 1980-2006 would seem to report weak cross-sectional dependence.     
15 Given the small sample size, the panel criterion developed in Bai & Ng (2002) cannot be used here as N is too 
small for precise estimation of the number of common factors.  
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where p is the order of the AR error process16 and the CIPS test statistic is given by:  

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The CIPS test loses power for T<20 and we therefore used it to test for convergence across 
the 14 major states over 1980-2006. In contrast to the results from Bai & Ng (2004) above, 
the null of unit root was not rejected by xit defined on either per capita services or per capita 
income thereby suggesting non-convergence in both per capita services and per capita 
income17. These findings were also supported by the covariate-recursive mean adjusted unit 
root test of Sul (2009) on the common factor18 in xit defined on both per capita services and 
per capita income for the 14 major states over both 1980-2006 and 1990-2006.  
 
In sum, per capita income levels are not converging across India's states based on most 
empirical results reported above. However, per capita services are found to converge based 
on results from traditional growth regressions as well as panel unit root tests under the 
assumption of weak cross-sectional dependence. This finding suggests that the divergence in 
per capita income over 1980-2007 is linked more to the country's non-services sectors. To 
test this conjecture empirically, we regressed the standard deviation in log of per capita 
income across the 14 major states (σpcyt) on the cross-sectional means of the logs of per capita 
services (pcsvsmt), per capita non-services (pcagrmt, pcindmt) and other control variables19 
over 1980-2007 and 1990-2007.  
 
σpcyt = α + β1pcsvsmt + β2pcagrmt + β3pcindmt + β4popmt + β5libmt + β6expdmt + εt 
 
We found per capita services to impact negatively and per capita industry to impact positively 
on the standard deviation in per capita income overtime20, thereby suggesting that Indian 
industry was driving the divergence in per capita income over these periods while services 
                                                 
16 This was found to be one for xit defined on per capita services and two for xit defined on per capita income. 
17 The computed CIPS test statistics had values of -1.6 and -1.63, respectively. 
18 As Sul (2009) has pointed out, if the null of unit root in the common factor is not rejected, then there is no 
need to test the hypothesis for the idiosyncratic factors (pp 2, op.cit).  
19 These included population (popmt), state-level openness index from Marjit et.al (2007) as a proxy for trade 
(libmt) and the share of developmental expenditure in GSDP (expdmt). Unfortunately, data on state-level GFKF 
was not available for all states to be included as an explanatory variable in this equation. Data on libmt was 
available from 1980 to 2002 and on expdmt from 1997 to 2007 only. 
20 Estimated β1was -0.34 over 1980-2007 and -0.31 over 1990-2007, with the respective 't' statistics being -7.2 
and -3.6. Estimated β3 was 0.46 over 1980-2007 and 0.56 over 1990-2007, with the respective 't' statistics being 
4.1 and 3.4. 
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had a dampening influence. Services growth can thus be the answer to India's income 
divergence in the long-run if this growth can offset the diverging impact of Indian industry 
building on the preponderance of the services sector in the country’s GDP and its growing 
share in the labour force. What is more, this makes services growth more politically 
sustainable than has been hitherto made out. This is also corroborated by the result for Bihar, 
the poorest amongst the major states, showing up above the fitted trend line in the years since 
1990 in a scatter plot of services share in GSDP against PCY levels for the 14 major states in 
Figure 1.  
<Insert Figure 1 here> 
 
4.  Where does the demand for services originate? 
 
So far we have documented the services growth in India at the sub-national level and also 
found evidence for this growth to be equalizing across India’s states. But where is the 
demand for these services coming from?  
 
If we assume for the sake of exposition that the entire GSDP of a state emanates from 
services, then using the fundamental macroeconomic identity, we have:  
 
YitS ≡ CitS + IitS + GitS + (XitS-MitS) 
 
wherein services output in state 'i' at time 't' (YitS) can be decomposed into internal/domestic 
absorption of services (CitS + IitS + GitS) and net services exports (XitS-MitS).  
 
(XitS-MitS) can also be looked at as the net consumption, investment and government demand 
for a state’s services output originating outside the domestic boundary of the state. We can 
thus also look at this identity as: 
 
YitS ≡ CitSInt S + IitSInt S + GitSInt + CitSExt S + IitSExt S + GitSExt  
 
where ‘Int’ is internal demand and includes both the state’s domestic absorption and demand 
for imports while ‘Ext’ is external demand or demand for exports. 
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In a similar vein, we can decompose demand for services into internal (intra-state) and 
external (extra-state but intra-India) demand to examine its origin. Our empirical model is a 
slight modification of the traditional Heston, Summers & Kravis (1983) equation which was 
used to determine whether services were income-elastic overtime. Instead of using countries, 
we consider Indian states and use an internal demand variable, which is nothing but the level 
of per capita income in each state. In addition, we look at the impact of income in the rest of 
the country – external demand - on the demand for services in a state. Moreover, in a 
secondary estimation, we decompose this external demand into that emanating from 
neighbouring states and from the rest of India, to examine if this demand is concentrated in 
the rich, neighbouring states or emanates from all over the country.  
 
5.  Empirical model 
 
Using state-level data over 1980-2006, we regress services output on internal demand 
(defined as the state’s per capita income), external demand (India’s GDP minus the 
concerned state’s GDP) and other control variables. The empirical model takes the following 
form: 
 
pcsvsit = αi + β1TRENDt + β2ipcinternalddit-1 + β3ipcexternalddit-1 + β4ilibit + β5iurbit + 
β6GATSt + β7CREATIONt21 + εit……...…………………………………………………...(1)  
 
where all economic data is in real values and all variables in lower case are in log terms. The 
variable description and source are provided in Table 3.  
 
<Insert Table 3 here> 
 
Given that internal demand is the sum of agriculture, industry and services value added, our 
model is likely to suffer from problems of endogeneity emanating from reverse causality. To 
mitigate this, we lag our explanatory internal and external demand variables by one period to 
                                                 
21The three new states of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Uttaranchal came into existence in 2000 and were hived 
off from MP, Bihar and UP, respectively. The data for the latter three states from 2000-01 onwards therefore 
account for this change in territory. In our empirical analysis, we control for this change by including a dummy 
for the year 2000-01 for Bihar, MP and UP. 
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nullify the impact of services value added in the reverse direction. This has two additional 
advantages. Firstly, it takes account of any autocorrelation that may be present in our time 
series as we are effectively using a lagged dependent variable on the RHS. Secondly, it 
makes use of the augmented demand model wherein services output in period 't-1' has an 
impact on services output in period 't.' 
 
A priori, we expect the estimates of β1 through β6 to be positive. 
 
The economic intuition for demand for services emanating from the output generated within 
the state is reasonably clear. As a state’s economy improves, the need for greater and better 
quality services would tend to go up domestically.  
 
Externally, the rise in demand for services emanating from rising extra-state income levels 
would tend to manifest itself in a rise in the state’s services exports.  
 
There are powerful forces at work in modern economies, some on the supply side, that imply 
actual shifts in the goods-services composition of output and employment. Some of these 
forces are demographic, for example, women’s greater presence in the work force (which has 
an impact on the demand for household services), aging population (which increases the 
demand for health services), urbanization and/or suburban sprawl (which raises the demand 
for utilities). Given that most supply-side variables would be collinear with each other in such 
estimation, we only use urbanization as an explanatory variable in our model to proxy for 
such forces.  
 
The shift to services may also be driven by public preferences for example, economic policies 
that reduce the rate of domestic investment in plant and equipment per unit of GDP such as 
deregulation, privatization and defense down-sizing. Arguably, the most powerful forces are 
knowledge-related. Advances in computer and communications technology, for example, 
have permanently increased demand for a wide range of communication services, 
revolutionized financial services and triggered explosive growth in the computer software 
industry. The effect of technological change is particularly evident in the production process 
itself through splintering. Technological change is also capital-embodied and as such, a rise 
in capital imports and FDI also has implications for the demand for services. We hope to 
capture all such factors through the trend variable. 
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Last, but not the least, is the impact of state-specific liberalization and domestic economy-
wide policy reform vis-à-vis the services sector, which we hope to capture through the LIB 
index values and the GATS dummy.   
 
6.  Issues in estimation  
 
The choice of the empirical strategy is governed by the underlying theory, data and its 
characteristics, recent developments in estimation methodology and any other objective(s) 
that the researcher may have.  
 
Data was not consistently available for all the variables in our model across all states over 
1980-2006. The maximum number of observations per variable for a major state was 27 
while that for a non-major state was between 11 and 14. Data was generally not available for 
the states from the North East during the 80s while the three newly formed states of 
Chattisgarh, Jharkhand and Uttaranchal came about only in 2000-01. Thus, constraints of 
data availability meant that estimation could be undertaken for the 14 major states only over 
1980-2006. 
 
Given the small size of our sample, it became imperative that we exploited the variation 
across both N and T; the model specification meant that we were dealing with a dynamic 
heterogeneous panel which would need to be tested for both stationarity and cross-sectional 
dependence before deciding on the estimation technique. But most importantly, we were 
interested in getting the estimation output for each N, which meant that the number of 
regressors would be 60 even in a simple OLS panel estimation. This had implications for the 
degrees of freedom available for model estimation, even more so if we needed to account for 
non-stationarity and cross-sectional dependence.    
 
We began by testing our empirical model for cross-sectional dependence using the Modified 
Lagrange Multiplier test in Pesaran (2004) and found the null of cross-sectional independence 
to be decisively rejected (the estimated test statistic was 4.8; p value = 0.0000; average 
absolute correlation = 0.226). Testing for the presence of unit root next, using the panel unit 
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root test suggested by Breitung & Das (2005), we found all our series to be non-stationary22. 
The results from the test are reported in Annex Table A223. These results meant that in panel 
estimation, we would need to account for both non-stationarity and cross-sectional 
dependence. 
 
Recent literature on the estimation of dynamic heterogeneous non-stationary panels with 
cross-sectional dependence deals only with large samples [for instance see Pesaran (2003, 
2006), Sarafidis (2007), Eberhardt & Bond (2009), Sarafidis & Robertson (2009), Bai (2010), 
Chudik et. al. (2010), Kapetanios, et. al. (2010), Pesaran & Tosetti (2010), Robertson et. al. 
(2010), Sarafidis & Wansbeek (2010)]. Even in the case of Pesaran (2006), Eberhardt & 
Bond (2009) and Chudik et. al. (2010), where the small sample properties of the estimators 
have been investigated using Monte Carlo experiments, the minimum size of N and T 
considered is 20, which still exceeds our sample size. These estimation techniques would thus 
not be strictly applicable to our sample; moreover using them could either result in 
statistically insignificant estimates or in non-estimation. In fact, our attempts at using the 
estimation techniques in Pesaran24 (2006) and Eberhardt & Bond25 (2009) confirmed this 
intuition.           
 
However, Pesaran (2006) notes that “In the case of panel data models where the cross section 
dimension (N) is small (typically N <10) and the time series dimension (T) is large the 
standard approach is to treat the equations from the different cross section units as a system 
of seemingly unrelated regression equations (SURE) and then estimate the system by the 
Generalized Least Squares (GLS) techniques. This approach allows for general (time-
invariant) correlation patterns across the errors in the different cross section equations26.”  
                                                 
22 Only the log of lib rejected the null of unit root at the 10% level of significance. 
23 We also carried out Augmented Dickey- Fuller (ADF) unit root tests on each of the series for each state 
separately to check them for stationarity. The results of these tests are included in Annex Table A3. We found 
the log of per capita services value added to be I(1) across all states (except West Bengal where it was I(2)). The 
lagged log values of our per capita demand variables were also largely non-stationary across states except in 
Andhra Pradesh and Punjab, where both internal demand and that emanating from neighbouring states were 
found to be stationary. Log of urbanization was also non-stationary in most states barring Andhra Pradesh, 
Kerala, MP and Orissa. Finally, the log of our liberalization index was found to be stationary in more than half 
of the states. 
24 Pesaran’s CCE estimators are based on an augmented regression model that includes the cross-sectional 
means of the dependent and independent variables on the RHS. Moreover, these estimators can be used 
irrespective of the order of integration of the underlying data (Kapetanios et. al., 2010). 
25 This involved a standard OLS estimation in first differences together with (T-1) time dummies in first 
differences in the first stage and then using the year dummy coefficients from the first stage regression in each 
of the N standard regressions in the second stage (this also includes a linear trend).  
26 Pesaran (2006) op.cit, pp1 
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 In light of the above, we decided to estimate our model using the dynamic feasible GLS 
(DGLS) of Moon & Perron (2004) which involves estimating an augmented dynamic 
regression model that includes the leads and lags of the first differences of the regressors on 
the RHS and is estimated using feasible GLS. This technique was found suitable for 
estimating a SUR model with integrated regressors, comprising N individual linear 
cointegrating regression equations such as ours27. The authors also found the DGLS estimator 
to be asymptotically more efficient than the dynamic OLS estimator. Moreover, using 
feasible GLS, we could control for both cross-sectional correlation and heteroskedasticity 
across panels and within-panel AR(1) serial correlation.     
 
The model was thus estimated in a panel by interacting the four cross-section varying 
explanatory variables with (N-1) state dummies together with the first28 lead and lag of the 
first differences of all regressors as below: 
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where  is the dependent variable; y x refer to the state-invariant explanatory variables 
(k’=3); refers to the (N-1) state dummies; iD x  refers to the state-varying explanatory 
variables (k=4); are the leads and lags of the first differences of 
the state-invariant and state-varying explanatory variables, respectively; and 
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term.  
 
A preliminary examination of the data also revealed the existence of multicollinearity 
emanating especially from the three state-invariant explanatory variables. In addition to 
estimating the model on the original data, to improve the precision of our estimates, we also 
used factor analysis to orthogonalise the correlated regressors; this generated a single factor, 
                                                 
27 We tested the N individual regression equations for cointegration using the Johansen-Juselius (1988, 1990, 
1991, 1992, 1994) cointegration tests. The results from this, reported in Annex Table A4, validate the presence 
of at least two cointegrating relationships among our variables, significant at 5% and 1%, across states, thereby 
indicating more stability in the system. We also tested the residuals from the cointegrating equations for 
stationarity and found the residuals to be stationary, which validated the cointegrating equation in each case.  
28 The number of leads and lags is close to T^(1/3). The size of our sample however meant that we could include 
only one lead and lag. 
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which was used instead of the correlated regressors while estimating the model. As a 
robustness check, we also mean-centered the explanatory variables and estimated the model 
separately to get a third set of results.  
 
7.  Results from estimation 
  
Table 4 reports the results from estimating the model using DGLS on both the original and 
transformed data. 
<Insert Table 4 here> 
 
Focusing first on the estimated internal demand elasticities, we found services in AP, BH and 
MP to be predominantly internal-demand driven (estimated elasticities were the largest in 
magnitude, statistically significant and the ratio of external-to-internal demand in the last 
column of Table 4 was well below unity) in all results. Additionally PJ, TN, UP and WB also 
reported large internal demand elasticities but these were not always statistically significant. 
Internal demand for services was also strong in MH but perhaps not as much as external 
demand. Most of these states are large and services-intensive economies and with the 
exception of UP, MP and Bihar, rich as well, all of which seems to drive these results.  
 
Looking next at the estimates of external demand elasticities, we find these to be large and 
statistically significant in HR, OR, KN and KR (also exceeding internal demand in most 
results). HR is adjacent to the National Capital Region (“NCR”) of Delhi, which possibly 
accounts for the importance of external demand while both KN and KR are surrounded by 
states which are amongst the richest in the country. These results may thus point to the 
importance of having rich neighbours, a hypothesis that we further tested in a secondary 
estimation below.  
 
Urbanization was found to be a strong and statistically significant explanatory variable of per 
capita services value added in most states thus negating any regional bias (though the 
negative sign on the estimated coefficient was a perverse result, possibly explained by the 
correlation of this variable with internal demand). The estimated coefficient on the 
liberalization variable was found to be statistically significant in most of our results and small 
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in magnitude; the negative sign in a few cases could be due to the collinearity emanating 
from the way this variable has been calibrated by Marjit et.al. (2007) 29. Creation and the 
GATS dummies lacked statistical significance in our results while the estimated trend was 
highly significant with a magnitude of 1.7-1.9% (p-value = 0).  
 
Interestingly, when we conducted a statistical test (chi-squared) of the ratio of external and 
internal demand being unity (results reported in the penultimate column of Table 4), we 
found this hypothesis to be rejected by at least half the states (AP, BH, HR, KN, KR, MH and 
OR always rejected the null of unity). In four of these states (HR, KN, KR, OR), the ratio 
exceeded unity while in two others (AP and BH), internal demand seemed to be the more 
important determinant of services. The results for MH, however, were inconclusive.  
 
To probe further into what drives these results, a more interesting take on external demand 
involved segregating it between demand emanating from neighbouring states and that from 
the rest of the country to examine if this demand is concentrated in a few states or spread 
throughout the country. The motivation for this also came from Table 5 that lists Indian 
states, the number and names of states each state is contiguous with and the associated per 
capita income. We further hypothesized that having rich neighbours should have a large and 
significant impact on the services demand of each state and the greater is the number of such 
neighbours, the larger should such impact be. 
 
<Insert Table 5 here> 
 
To test this conjecture, we carried out a secondary regression distilling the impact of external 
demand into that emanating from neighbouring states (pcneighdd) and the rest of the country 
(pcrestdd), with the other control variables remaining the same as in the primary estimation.  
 
pcsvsit = αi + β1TRENDt +β2ipcinternalddit-1 + β3ipcneighddit-1 + β4ipcrestddit-1 + β5ilibit + 
β6iurbit + β7GATSt + β8CREATIONt + εit ………………………………………………...(2) 
 
                                                 
29 The authors link the level of output of a specific state to all-India trade figures to get an approximate indicator 
of how much ‘open’ it is. If for a specific state most of the production is concentrated in items that contribute 
largely to export value at the all-India level, then it is reasonable to conclude that the particular state is attuned 
to exports. Similarly, if a state has high production value of import substitutes, then it must be relying less on 
imports and hence is not so open. 
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The results from this secondary estimation are reported in Table 6. 
 
<Insert Table 6 here> 
 
The first interesting observation is that demand from neighbouring states is a statistically 
insignificant determinant of services value added in almost all states and is also associated 
with negative elasticities. The exception to this is WB, where the demand from neighbouring 
states is positive and statistically significant and also more important than the demand 
originating in the rest of India (the ratio of the absolute values of rest and neighbouring 
demand in the last column of Table 6 is well below unity; this finding is also statistically 
validated by the chi-squared test in the penultimate column of Table 6).  
 
Secondly, in the cases of HR, KN and KR, where external demand was found to be more 
important, this demand does not originate from rich neighbouring states as hypothesized but 
from the rest of India (this finding is statistically significant in the cases of KN and KR and 
also statistically validated for KR by the chi-squared test). Moreover, while external demand 
was a statistically significant determinant of services demand for HR, KN, KR and OR, we 
find one of its components - demand from the rest of India – to be statistically significant for 
GJ as well.  
 
Thirdly, demand from the neighbouring states seems more important than that from the rest 
of India for four states – AP, BH, TN and WB – and of these, neither BH nor WB has a rich 
neighbour. Statistically, this finding is validated by the chi-squared test for AP, BH and WB. 
In fact, the null of the ratio of rest and neighbouring demand equalling unity is conclusively 
rejected by nine of the fourteen states; in three of these, the ratio falls short (AP, BH and WB) 
while in the remaining six, it exceeds unity (KR, MH, MP, PJ, RJ and UP).  
  
Thus, on the whole, despite the importance of internal demand for the large, services-
intensive states, external demand seems to be a more important determinant of services value 
added in a larger number of states. Moreover, our results do not seem to suggest either any 
“neighbourhood” or any “rich neighbour” effect on services demand; instead, wherever 
relevant, they rather point to the demand for services emanating from all over the country and 
the relative ease with which such services may in fact be crossing borders within India, 
thereby promoting convergence across states. 
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8.  Conclusion 
 
The analysis in this paper confirms that India’s states mirror the remarkable performance of 
the country’s services sector at the national level. Critics of the services growth process, 
however, claim that this growth is not sustainable. Our results, however, suggest that the 
demand for services is spread throughout the country and that per capita services are 
converging across states and time, which makes this growth both progressive and politically 
sustainable. The services performance of Bihar is a case in point. 
 
At the moment, convergence in services is not resulting in convergence in income due to the 
offsetting impact of divergence in industry and the concentration of the labour force in 
agriculture. However, with services growth adding further to services share in GDP and 
employing a greater share of the country's labour force, this growth is bound to have positive 
implications for income distribution. Moreover, services growth is not restricted to sectors 
like financial and business services where concentration effects are more pronounced, but is 
equally visible in construction, distribution, transport and tourism, where the benefits from 
the growth process are more widely distributed. Additionally, the human capital skill 
requirements are less intense in these sectors and the growth process would therefore involve 
a greater share of the labour force overtime, drawing people away from agriculture.   
 
Literature also suggests that exports have contributed almost 25% to the growth of services 
value added (Eichengreen & Gupta, 2010) overtime; in fact, the share of services exports in 
GDP has risen from 3% in 1990 to 15% in 2006. These results are also supported by the 
empirical analysis in this paper which suggests that even at the state level, external demand is 
an important determinant of services value added. All this coupled with India’s current small 
share in global trade and its increasingly important role as a global services exporter also 
point to the potential for more services-export led growth going ahead. Significantly, in light 
of our results on convergence, such growth could also be more equalizing, which bodes well 
for the country's future, even from a political economy perspective. 
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Figure 1: Scatter plot of services share in GSDP against real PCY levels 
for major states 
 
Services share in GSDP plotted against real per capita 
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Table 1: A snapshot of India’s states
 
State 1980-90 1990-2000 2000-07 1980-90 1990-2000 2000-07 1980-90 1990-2000 2000-07 1980-90 1990-2000 2000-07 Avg. 1983, 88 1994 Avg. 2000, 04 1994/80s 2000s/94
Uttar Pradesh* (UP) 122.1 150.2 173.3 5006 8916 11291 35.5 38.6 44.7 5.6 4.8 6.0 21.8 24.8 29.0 35.2 33.3
Maharashtra* (MH) 68.9 86.2 100.2 13512 21510 28163 43.9 50.4 58.7 5.9 7.5 8.5 24.9 29.6 35.3 43.1 33.3
Bihar* (BH) 76.5 94.6 87.1 4168 4534 7264 30.7 36.1 54.8 5.8 4.7 6.2 17.2 19.0 21.1 32.9 30.2
West Bengal* (WB) 59.7 73.4 82.4 9791 13768 19790 44.6 47.5 53.5 4.5 7.4 7.6 29.7 33.1 34.9 37.4 20.3
Andhra Pradesh* (AP) 58.6 71.0 78.6 9865 14398 21157 39.0 44.3 49.6 6.6 6.4 8.5 22.3 24.1 30.5 39.9 28.2
Tamil Nadu* (TN) 51.6 58.6 63.8 13144 19422 24937 35.7 43.4 56.8 6.3 8.5 7.1 28.5 30.6 34.4 26.2 19.0
Madhya Pradesh* (MP) 57.5 88.5 62.9 5864 6368 13208 32.7 35.5 49.6 5.0 6.2 5.0 15.2 17.4 22.3 37.6 38.7
Rajasthan* (RJ) 38.3 48.8 59.6 8711 13031 16152 36.0 39.7 42.9 8.1 8.0 7.1 24.2 28.5 31.2 37.2 21.4
Karnataka* (KN) 40.5 48.4 54.3 9619 14678 21477 37.1 43.4 51.1 6.3 8.9 8.0 22.2 23.9 27.7 34.3 30.0
Gujarat* (GJ) 37.2 44.7 52.5 12183 18723 25337 30.4 32.0 37.6 6.9 8.7 9.5 26.9 26.7 30.2 17.7 37.5
Orissa* (OR) 28.4 33.8 37.6 4944 5819 7424 29.9 37.4 45.1 6.3 5.5 7.9 20.2 19.4 24.0 12.6 27.1
Kerala* (KR) 27.0 30.3 32.7 11856 17670 26547 47.8 51.5 59.4 3.5 7.1 9.2 36.0 41.9 50.5 35.7 28.8
Jharkhand (JH) 28.2 14281 38.3 6.6 29.1
Assam (AS) 24.9 27.4 1559 1807 36.3 42.1 48.1 4.5 3.8 6.4 25.9 26.1 31.7 25.8 56.3
Punjab* (PJ) 18.1 21.9 25.6 18740 24760 30486 37.6 36.9 42.5 4.0 5.7 6.0 32.7 40.2 44.8 45.6 35.2
Haryana* (HY) 14.3 18.2 22.0 16137 21981 29325 29.2 33.3 41.9 5.8 6.4 10.7 29.1 44.3 41.5 76.6 21.2
Chattisgarh (CH) 21.6 6090 39.2 7.1 20.5
Jammu & Kashmir (JK) 9.1 10.6 14854 16570 36.9 42.5 46.4 4.4 34.7 46.7 40.8 69.9 12.7
Uttaranchal (UT) 8.8 19657 49.8 9.9 33.9
Himachal Pradesh (HP) 5.7 6.4 20434 28531 34.8 36.7 38.0 5.3 7.5 8.0 18.2 27.0 33.3 81.2 28.9
Tripura (TR) 3.1 3.2 7077 10949 54.5 52.8 10.4 11.4 54.8 52.4 57.2 29.3 19.8
Manipur (MA) 2.1 2.4 12761 16452 42.3 48.6 43.1 6.6 13.4 26.9 35.7 30.6 73.8 4.5
Meghalaya (ME) 2.1 2.4 14318 19071 46.7 53.0 51.3 6.5 20.5 20.4 21.7 67.5 -3.6
Nagaland (NA) 1.6 2.2 16266 18407 59.4 53.9 3.8 7.8 85.6 46.0 40.6 -49.8 67.4
Goa (GO) 1.3 1.5 38950 49331 48.5 50.4 47.1 6.6 7.8 9.2 49.3 60.4 64.6 66.9 6.9
Arunachal Pradesh (AR) 1.0 1.1 9750 11009 32.6 38.2 44.0 8.0 7.7 10.4 60.9 19.6 22.9 -45.5 -7.1
Mizoram (MZ) 0.9 18083 20071 61.4 64.4 7.3 21.6 23.8 31.8 45.8 60.0
Sikkim (SI) 0.5 0.6 10142 13033 48.8 52.1 10.4 8.4 32.0 40.9 43.6 71.8 25.4
ALL INDIA 748 919 1072 11785 16310 22243 36.9 41.9 48.3 7.1 7.4 8.4 24.4 27.3 31.1 35.8 28.7
Population (mn)
Growth rate of 
services employment 
(%)
Real per capita income (Indian 
Rupees)
Services share in real GSDP 
(%)
Growth rate of real services 
value-added (%) Services share in employment (%)
 
Source: National Account Statistics, CSO; National Sample Survey Organization; various years. (Own calculations) 
Note: (1) * indicates the 14 major states (2) The table is sorted by descending order of population by state over 2000-07 (3) Figures exceeding the all-India numbers are italicised  (4) For the 
new states of CH, JH and UT, the employment data is only for the year 2004.  
 
 
29 
Table 2: Sectoral breakdown of services contribution to GSDP and employment by state (2000-07) 
 
 
 
30 
 
 
State Constrn Uts Rlys Other trans Comm Trade, H&R FS RE & bus. PubAd Others Constrn Uts Rlys Other trans Comm Trade, H&R FS RE & bus. PubAd Others Constrn Uts TSC Trade, H&R FS CSP
UP* 5.5 3.9 1.8 4.3 2.2 12.3 3.8 6.9 5.4 8.0 14.0 20.6 15.0 22.1 38.1 12.4 14.3 16.5 16.0 19.7 5.8 0.2 4.0 11.0 1.1 8.6
MH* 5.2 2.6 0.7 5.2 3.4 15.6 11.6 10.8 4.2 7.4 30.5 -0.1 4.8 6.6 11.8 5.0 10.6 3.7 2.6 1.4 4.9 0.4 5.4 11.2 2.8 10.5
BH* 4.7 1.1 3.1 2.5 1.7 18.4 3.9 4.0 6.9 14.1 8.9 -1.2 14.4 12.4 12.1 8.4 7.5 4.4 8.9 3.6 3.1 0.2 2.6 8.8 0.7 6.2
WB* 5.7 1.8 1.4 4.8 2.0 15.2 6.2 9.0 5.2 9.7 13.1 8.7 5.6 6.4 15.6 6.4 3.3 11.7 3.8 5.4 4.2 0.3 5.8 13.2 1.8 10.0
AP* 6.3 2.5 1.5 4.6 2.8 13.4 4.7 8.4 4.7 9.7 8.7 3.9 6.2 8.5 23.6 7.4 8.6 8.4 4.8 6.7 4.9 0.2 4.4 9.9 1.4 9.7
TN* 7.3 1.8 1.1 5.9 3.4 16.3 7.6 7.6 5.1 9.8 31.5 40.7 4.4 5.5 17.8 2.3 12.3 12.9 9.1 6.5 5.9 0.3 4.9 11.6 2.5 9.5
MP* 6.8 3.2 2.5 3.0 1.9 15.4 4.2 7.7 4.7 10.2 7.1 10.7 5.0 6.3 16.7 6.0 9.2 2.8 4.9 3.1 3.9 0.2 2.3 7.9 0.8 7.7
RJ* 10.6 3.8 1.4 2.9 2.3 13.2 3.7 6.8 4.1 8.2 12.0 2.1 8.9 6.5 19.8 3.4 8.7 4.4 3.0 2.6 10.6 0.5 3.6 8.0 1.3 8.0
KN* 7.3 2.6 0.6 4.1 2.9 12.8 6.3 12.2 4.4 8.0 6.2 5.3 11.5 7.1 24.2 8.6 8.6 9.6 3.1 3.5 4.0 0.2 3.6 10.1 1.9 7.8
GJ* 5.6 2.8 0.8 4.5 2.7 14.6 5.8 5.5 3.4 5.9 10.9 7.2 7.2 8.1 22.0 11.9 5.1 2.3 -1.0 3.7 4.7 0.3 4.5 10.8 1.3 8.2
OR* 4.4 2.8 3.1 5.2 2.9 10.3 5.1 5.3 5.4 7.7 -1.7 9.7 8.2 11.3 27.4 7.2 12.9 3.7 1.7 3.5 5.8 0.3 2.8 8.4 1.0 7.3
KR* 10.7 2.0 0.5 7.2 3.7 20.1 5.6 9.1 4.9 8.3 10.3 8.0 8.4 10.3 24.2 4.1 10.5 9.5 9.1 3.9 11.6 0.4 8.4 15.8 3.2 12.8
JH 6.2 1.9 3.1 2.7 2.0 9.8 2.2 4.5 5.3 8.3 4.3 6.0 6.1 3.3 14.6 7.3 7.4 7.0 18.5 4.0 10.8 0.3 3.6 9.0 1.3 6.0
AS 5.5 1.5 1.8 3.2 1.6 13.1 3.4 3.4 6.1 15.5 10.3 16.8 8.2 6.3 7.3 7.6 6.8 7.6 3.3 4.3 2.8 0.3 3.8 11.3 0.7 15.9
PJ* 5.6 3.2 12.9 4.9 4.5 4.8 8.6 10.7 2.7 5.3 6.7 3.0 3.1 3.2 9.1 1.3 6.5 14.4 1.9 13.0
HR* 9.2 1.5 1.2 5.3 1.7 16.5 3.6 3.8 3.0 6.8 12.1 7.2 9.3 13.3 25.4 12.9 6.5 5.5 5.2 6.1 8.9 0.9 5.6 14.0 1.9 11.6
CH 4.2 3.9 2.0 2.8 1.5 11.0 2.6 5.8 4.2 9.1 13.3 -3.2 5.9 11.6 14.7 11.4 6.4 6.4 8.2 25.5 4.8 0.1 8.8 10.0
JK 10.6 7.4 4.2 7.3 4.2 6.7 13.9 10.1 8.5 -0.4 11.3 3.6 7.7 2.8 0.0 7.6 11.2 1.2 4.5 9.8 0.7 15.4
UT 10.6 3.2 1.6 4.6 1.9 16.1 3.4 5.5 5.8 10.8 18.9 24.1 5.9 12.1 17.5 8.0 7.6 4.2 8.7 8.9 8.2 0.5 3.8 11.4 1.3 11.8
HP 19.0 6.2 2.9 9.2 4.3 4.6 6.2 9.9 7.0 13.5 6.5 10.7 1.6 7.5 13.0 3.0 4.1 4.7 12.7 2.0 3.7 5.0 0.9 10.1
TR 19.1 2.3 3.2 4.4 12.0 2.3 3.0 14.5 13.4 14.3 18.6 16.5 5.3 59.7 5.6 13.9 3.8 6.6 2.2 9.6 0.1 3.4 13.3 0.4 30.5
MA 22.8 3.3 1.7 1.0 7.7 1.8 3.0 14.7 12.1 1.6 2.0 3.6 5.2 1.0 13.2 11.7 12.1 8.3 13.9 3.0 0.0 2.7 8.6 0.5 16.5
ME 9.9 3.7 5.6 1.6 9.8 3.1 9.5 13.4 8.3 7.8 3.9 9.1 9.1 5.9 9.6 3.3 4.6 2.5 0.3 1.6 6.5 0.2 11.8
NA 10.7 1.5 0.1 13.9 1.4 5.3 1.4 10.6 13.9 8.3 13.0 11.3 14.9 6.9 16.2 10.4 18.2 11.9 7.6 6.6 2.3 1.0 1.9 10.9 0.5 25.6
GO 5.4 2.1 0.4 12.3 0.8 10.2 8.3 6.3 4.4 4.4 3.2 9.8 8.8 15.4 18.3 -4.1 7.8 5.3 -1.1 5.3 13.5 1.3 13.2 21.4 2.7 15.5
AR 19.7 5.4 2.9 2.2 5.7 2.5 2.8 16.1 11.5 24.2 44.7 158.7 4.6 9.6 6.3 6.9 4.0 7.2 5.5 4.7 0.7 0.4 4.4 0.5 12.3
MZ 11.2 4.4 1.6 0.7 7.9 3.0 15.8 21.2 13.9 9.5 6.5 17.1 12.7 15.0 -0.2 14.8 9.2 11.2 3.3 3.4 0.0 1.4 8.5 0.6 18.1
SI 17.4 5.7 4.1 5.1 3.1 6.6 18.0 15.1 5.3 1.2 14.3 6.4 6.9 8.9 4.3 5.8 5.8 1.9 3.4 10.0 0.6 19.7
Average 6.7 2.7 1.5 4.6 2.2 14.4 5.9 7.7 4.9 8.8 11.3 10.0 15.0 9.4 18.9 6.9 9.3 6.9 5.9 6.3 6.5 0.5 4.3 10.6 1.6 12.6
~~~~~Svs emp (% share of total emp)~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Svs VA (% share of GSDP)~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Svs VA growth rates (%)~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
 
Source: National Account Statistics, CSO; National Sample Survey Organization; own calculations 
Note: (1) The employment shares are averages of data in 2000 and 2004 except for CH, JH and UT where data is only for 2004 (2) * indicates the 14 major states (3) The table is sorted by 
descending order of population by state over 2000-07 (4) Figures exceeding the average numbers are italicised (5) Sectors read left to right as follows: Construction; Utilities; Railways; Other 
transport; Communications; Trade, Hotels & Restaurants; Financial Services; Real estate & business; and Public Administration. “TSC” stands for Transport, Storage & Communications and 
“CSP” for Community, Social & Personal Services.   
Table 3: List of variables, description and data source
 
Variable  Description Data Source 
PCSVS  State’s per capita services value added NAS, CSO, various years 
(author’s calculations) 
TREND The time trend for productivity which is used as a proxy for 
technological advancements measured by trade restrictiveness indices 
 
Internaldd  State’s per capita income NAS, CSO, various years 
Externaldd  The ratio of GDP for India minus GSDP for a state to the population 
of India minus the population of that state 
NAS, CSO, various years 
(author’s calculations) 
LIB  Values from an openness index for Indian states over 1980-2003 Developed by Marjit Sugata, 
Saibal Kar and Dibyendu Maiti 
(2007)30 
URB  The share of urban population in a state’s total population Census Reports, various years 
GATS  A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 from 1995 onwards and 0 
before that 
 
CREATION  A dummy variable for Bihar, MP and UP that takes the value 1 in 
2000-01 to control for the creation of the three new states 
 
 
 
                                                 
30 In the absence of trade data in India at the state level, the authors link the level of output of a specific state to 
all-India trade figures to get an approximate indicator of how much ‘open’ it is. If for a specific state most of the 
production is concentrated in items that contribute largely to export value at the all-India level, then it is 
reasonable to conclude that the particular state is attuned to exports. Similarly, if a state has high production 
value of import substitutes, then it must be relying less on imports and hence is not so open. 
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Table 4: Results from estimation 
 
State Intercept Intdd Extdd Urb Lib Extdd=Intdd Abs(extdd/intdd) Intercept Intdd Extdd Urb Lib Extdd=Intdd Abs(extdd/intdd) Intercept Intdd Extdd Urb Lib Extdd=Intdd Abs(extdd/intdd)
AP -3.42 0.88 0.08 0.92 -0.20 N 0.09 -6.70 0.97 0.11 1.12 -0.24 N 0.12 6.35 0.90 0.02 0.93 -0.21 N 0.02
-2.7 8.3 0.5 3.4 -3.6 14.8 -8.7 8.8 3.6 4.6 -4.1 6.6 513.1 8.8 0.1 3.8 -3.8 14.8
BH 2.43 1.94 -0.64 -0.64 0.21 N 0.33 -3.70 1.93 0.25 -0.75 0.23 N 0.13 5.13 1.92 -0.68 -0.68 0.22 N 0.36
3.5 8.3 -5.1 -4.3 4.9 55.2 2.1 7.6 -4.6 -5.6 5.5 44.0 -64.9 8.3 -5.3 -4.9 5.2 55.2
GJ -5.46 0.39 -0.23 3.13 -0.33 Y 0.59 -10.2# 0.38 0.45 3.94 -0.30 Y 1.17 6.42# 0.38 -0.18 2.80 -0.35 Y 0.47
-1.1 -3.9 -1.0 2.0 -1.3 0.6 -1.8 -4.5 -1.1 2.5 -0.5 0.3 1.9 -4.3 -0.6 1.6 -1.3 0.6
HR -1.21 0.46 1.30 -1.64 0.02 N 2.83 -4.69 0.59 0.59# -0.84# 0.00 N 1.00 6.72 0.51 1.21 -1.59 0.00 N 2.37
2.5 -2.3 2.4 -2.3 2.9 7.0 2.5 -2.0 1.9 -1.8 3.1 5.0 4.3 -2.1 2.4 -2.3 2.9 7.0
KN -3.01 0.62# 0.52 0.29 0.00 N 0.84 -10.96 0.23 0.26 2.52 -0.04 N 1.14 6.46 0.45 0.51 1.07 0.00 N 1.13
0.3 -2.0 2.9 -1.1 3.4 14.7 -3.9 -5.5 3.9 3.0 3.3 24.2 5.7 -3.5 3.7 0.3 3.5 14.7
KR -0.36 0.15 1.00 -0.41 -0.11 N 6.57 -3.49 0.35 0.29 -0.19 -0.13 N 0.81 6.72 0.25 0.85 -0.33 -0.15 N 3.34
4.0 -5.3 5.8 -5.1 1.3 26.0 4.6 -4.1 4.3 -5.2 1.5 18.1 26.1 -4.8 5.2 -5.1 0.9 26.0
MP 4.82 1.32 0.97 -3.64 -0.02 N 0.73 -2.36 1.31 0.27 -2.48 -0.04 Y 0.21 5.50 1.30 1.02 -3.89 -0.03 N 0.79
8.2 4.2 4.5 -9.3 3.3 5.6 5.7 3.3 3.6 -8.7 3.4 0.9 -32.7 4.0 5.3 -10.4 3.2 5.6
MH -9.44 0.53 -0.94 5.22 -0.08 N# 1.80 -15.85 0.54 0.34 7.09 -0.08 N 0.63 6.89 0.58 -0.99 4.94 -0.08 N 1.70
-2.9 -2.3 -4.3 3.9 1.5 6.2 -4.5 -2.7 -6.1 5.6 1.9 11.8 13.4 -2.1 -4.4 3.8 1.6 6.2
OR -0.62 0.10 1.38 -2.01 0.10 N 13.20 -4.12 0.09 0.46 -0.76 0.09 N 5.25 5.33 0.12 1.17 -1.51 0.09 N 9.45
3.2 -4.6 3.9 -3.5 4.5 15.5 3.1 -5.1 3.1 -2.1 5.0 16.4 -31.7 -4.6 3.3 -2.8 4.5 15.5
PJ -0.10 0.87 -0.18 0.39 0.07 Y 0.21 -3.88 1.06 0.34 0.83 0.06 Y 0.32 6.96 0.60 0.09 0.02 0.07 Y 0.15
2.9 0.0 -1.0 -0.8 4.8 0.7 2.8 0.4 -2.0 -0.5 4.9 1.8 19.8 -1.3 0.3 -1.5 4.8 0.7
RJ -17.93 0.31 -0.45 7.92 0.16 Y 1.46 -22.25 0.24 0.36 8.40 0.15 Y 1.50 6.08 0.30 -0.44# 7.47 0.15 Y 1.45
-4.5 -3.4 -2.1 4.9 4.9 0.1 -4.9 -4.2 -1.5 5.3 5.2 0.8 -7.7 -3.7 -1.8 4.3 4.8 0.1
TN -1.42# 0.86 0.48 -0.56 0.00 Y 0.56 -4.10 0.99 0.41 -0.65 0.01 Y 0.41 6.63 0.97 0.25 -0.51 -0.01 Y 0.26
1.9 -0.1 1.3 -4.6 3.4 0.1 2.8 0.1 1.3 -5.7 4.0 0.6 14.9 0.4 0.8 -4.8 3.2 0.1
UP (omitted) 0.70 0.14 1.96 0.39 Y 0.20 -11.54 0.80 0.24 3.12 0.32 Y 0.30 5.41 0.71# 0.04 2.19 0.45 Y 0.05
-1.6 0.4 2.2 6.4 0.9 -3.8 -1.5 -1.3 4.0 5.8 0.0 -30.5 -1.7 0.1 2.5 7.0 0.9
WB 31.1 0.99 0.67 -11.09 -0.03 Y 0.68 15.97 1.17 0.29 -6.82 0.00 Y 0.25 6.46 0.97 0.66 -11.08 -0.02 N# 0.68
9.3 0.8 3.0 -9.1 2.9 3.4 8.2 1.5 1.4 -7.9 4.0 0.0 6.5 0.5 3.4 -9.9 3.3 3.4
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~DGLS, original data~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~DGLS, factor scores~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~DGLS, mean centered~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
 
 
Note: (1) Highlighted estimates indicate statistical significance at 5% (2) Italicized figures are the values for the associated relevant test statistics (3) # indicates statistical significance at 10%   
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Table 5: The “neighbourhood” profile of Indian states
 
State
Svs share in real 
PCY (%)
Svs share in 
employment (%)
Real PCY (INR, 
2000-07) Contiguous boundary with:
Number of 
neighbours
Rank_Real 
PCY
Rank_ Svs share in 
real PCY
Rank_ Svs share in 
employment
AP 49.6 30.5 21157 MH*, CH, OR, KN*, TN* 5 10 14 18
AR 44.0 22.9 11009 AS, NA 2 23 20 24
AS 48.1 31.7 1807 AR, NA, MZ, MA, ME, TR,  WB 7 28 15 15
BH 54.8 21.1 7264 UP, JH, WB 3 26 5 27
CH 39.2 20.5 6090 UP, MP, MH*, JH, AP*, OR 6 27 25 28
GJ 37.6 30.2 25337 RJ, MP, MH* 3 7 28 19
GO 47.1 64.6 49331 MH*, KN* 2 1 16 1
HP 38.0 33.3 28531 JK, PJ*, HR*, UP, UT 5 4 27 13
HR 41.9 41.5 29325 PJ*, RJ, HP*, UT, TP 5 3 24 6
JH 38.3 29.1 14281 BH, WB, OR, CH, UP 5 19 26 20
JK 46.4 40.8 16570 HP*, PJ* 2 16 17 7
KN 51.1 27.7 21477 GO*, MH*, AP*, TN*, KR* 5 9 11 22
KR 59.4 50.5 26547 TN*, KN* 2 6 2 3
MA 43.1 30.6 16452 NA, MZ, AS 3 17 21 17
ME 51.3 21.7 19071 AS 1 14 10 26
MH 58.7 35.3 28163 GO*, GJ*, MP, CH, AP*, KN* 6 5 3 9
MP 49.6 22.3 13208 UP, RJ, GJ*, MH*, CH 5 20 13 25
MZ 64.4 31.8 20071 TR, AS, MA 3 11 1 14
NA 53.9 40.6 18407 AR, AS, MA 3 15 6 8
OR 45.1 24.0 7424 JH, WB, CH, AP* 4 25 18 23
PJ 42.5 44.8 30486 JK, HP*, RJ, HR* 4 2 23 4
RJ 42.9 31.2 16152 PJ*, HR*, UP, MP, GJ* 5 18 22 16
SI 52.1 43.6 13033 WB 1 21 9 5
TN 56.8 34.4 24937 AP*, KN*, KR* 3 8 4 11
TR 52.8 57.2 10949 AS, MZ 2 24 8 2
UP 44.7 29.0 11291 UT, HR*, RJ, MP, CH, JH, BH 7 22 19 21
UT 49.8 33.9 19657 HP*, HR*, UP 3 13 12 12
WB 53.5 34.9 19790 OR, JH, BH, SI, AS 5 12 7 10  
 
Note: * indicates rich neighbour [top 10 in terms of real per capita income] 
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Table 6: Decomposing external demand - from neighbours and rest of India 
 
State Intercept Intdd Neighdd Restdd Urb Lib Restdd=Neighdd Abs(restdd/neighdd) Intercept Intdd Neighdd Restdd Urb Lib Restdd=Neighdd Abs(restdd/neighdd) Intercept Intdd Neighdd Restdd Urb Lib Restdd=Neighdd Abs(restdd/neighdd)
AP -0.79 1.08 -0.59 0.08 0.92 -0.17 N 0.13 -7.26 1.13 -0.50 0.65 1.47 -0.21 N 1.31 6.36 1.18 -0.57 0.01 0.89 -0.20 N 0.03
-0.9 10.6 -6.4 0.6 4.1 -3.5 8.9 -11.2 12.4 -5.8 5.6 7.1 -4.9 39.6 516.3 11.8 -6.2 0.1 3.8 -4.1 8.9
BH 0.83 1.72 -0.61 -0.44 -1.17 0.17 N 0.73 -0.10 1.64 -0.49 0.17 -1.37 0.20 N 0.35 5.12 1.77 -0.57 -0.47 -1.06 0.17 N 0.83
1.1 4.5 -0.2 -3.4 -7.0 5.4 4.0 5.5 3.6 0.1 -3.2 -9.6 6.9 4.1 -82.3 4.1 0.1 -3.1 -6.2 5.9 4.0
GJ 2.60 0.12 -0.24 0.69 0.02 -0.44 Y 2.87 -7.20 0.15 -0.16 0.77 2.45 -0.34 Y 4.77 6.43 0.11 -0.21 0.59 0.48 -0.44 Y 2.83
2.3 -7.7 2.9 2.3 -1.1 -3.3 0.5 0.0 -8.0 2.7 0.4 1.0 -1.4 0.4 2.5 -8.7 3.1 2.1 -0.5 -3.0 0.5
HR 1.50 0.36 -0.21 0.26 0.49 -0.02 Y 1.23 -4.24 0.68 -0.14 0.47 0.92 0.02 N# 3.45 6.66 0.43 -0.20 0.28 0.37 -0.02 Y 1.41
2.9 -4.8 3.0 0.6 -0.6 3.0 0.1 3.9 -2.8 2.8 -0.6 -0.7 4.8 3.1 5.0 -4.7 2.9 0.9 -0.7 3.5 0.1
KN 0.31 0.59 -0.34 0.54 0.03 -0.06 Y 1.57 -12.39 0.05 -0.13 1.03 3.51 -0.14 Y 7.88 6.39 0.40 -0.26 0.64 0.56 -0.10# Y 2.43
1.3 -4.6 2.7 3.5 -2.7 2.3 2.2 -4.8 -9.0 3.7 2.6 4.4 1.6 0.0 1.3 -6.9 3.3 4.3 -0.9 1.9 2.2
KR -0.29 -1.55 -0.54 3.26 -0.28 -0.39 N 6.00 -5.26 -1.65 -0.13 3.60 -0.01 -0.48 N 28.20 6.82 -1.45 -0.67 3.34 -0.22 -0.40 N 4.99
0.7 -16.8 0.3 13.2 -5.4 -3.7 100.4 2.9 -15.9 2.5 11.0 -7.1 -4.4 46.7 24.3 -16.3 -0.7 13.6 -4.8 -3.2 100.4
MP -16.40 -0.15 -1.00 -0.90 10.47 -0.42 N 0.90 -1.13 1.3# 0.24 0.65 -2.64 -0.04 N 2.75 5.47 1.31 0.29 0.66 -4.88 -0.04 Y 2.27
1.6 2.2 3.8 1.3 -3.8 2.8 0.8 6.2 1.7 3.5 0.0 -2.9 3.8 10.6 -28.6 1.3 4.1 1.9 -4.0 3.2 0.8
MH 1.50 1.31 0.17 0.50 -4.12 -0.03 Y 2.96 -27.10 -0.13 -0.98 -0.89 13.40 -0.42 N 0.91 6.82 -0.10 -0.95 -0.98 10.51 -0.39 N 1.03
-6.9 -8.1 -2.6 -7.0 8.5 -2.6 6.4 -9.2 -8.7 -3.1 -11.9 11.1 -2.3 21.3 11.5 -8.6 -2.4 -7.0 8.7 -2.0 6.4
OR 2.13 0.35 -0.16 0.45 -0.7# 0.10 Y 2.77 -3.64 0.28 -0.42 1.05 0.85 0.10 Y 2.49 5.35 0.40 -0.19 0.36 -0.27 0.10 Y 1.92
3.4 -3.8 1.3 0.9 -1.9 5.4 0.0 4.3 -4.2 0.2 0.9 -0.6 6.2 0.2 -15.5 -3.9 1.2 0.8 -1.3 5.8 0.0
PJ 5.24 0.90 -0.13 -0.21 -0.92 0.10 N 1.59 -1.80 1.59 -0.10 -0.19 -0.45 0.10 N 1.80 7.00 1.25 -0.18 -0.18 -1.75 0.12 N# 0.96
5.5 -0.6 4.0 -1.1 -2.3 4.8 3.3 7.4 3.2 4.1 -5.1 -4.6 6.8 26.9 29.5 0.3 3.5 -0.8 -3.7 5.8 3.3
RJ -23.02 0.30 -0.49 -0.98 11.77 0.40 N 2.02 -29.00 0.27 -0.16 -0.48 11.99 0.35 N 3.06 6.05 0.23 -0.42 -1.00 12.16 0.39 N 2.41
-8.6 -5.5 0.7 -4.4 8.9 8.2 13.0 -8.0 -6.1 2.4 -4.6 8.3 8.3 18.5 -12.9 -6.6 1.2 -4.4 9.9 8.9 13.0
TN 3.74 1.08 -0.80 0.00 0.14 -0.12 Y 0.01 -1.32 1.06 -0.59 0.72 -0.19 -0.10 Y 1.21 6.55 1.02 -0.71 0.08 0.02 -0.11# Y 0.12
6.4 0.0 -2.2 -0.6 -3.3 1.0 1.2 8.8 -0.7 -0.9 0.5 -7.5 2.5 0.7 13.9 -1.6 -1.5 0.6 -3.7 1.8 1.2
UP (omitted) 0.73 0.26 -0.47 -0.35 0.34 N 1.80 -4.30 0.86 0.39 -0.24 1.07 0.11 N 0.62 5.51 0.71 0.23 -0.44 0.14# 0.40 N 1.93
-3.11 7.86 -4.14 -2.69 5.73 38.3 2.7 -2.9 9.1 -7.6 -1.1 4.9 82.5 -31.5 -4.53 7.87 -3.66 -1.77 8.05 38.3
WB 30.98 0.81 0.48 0.17 -10.64 0.04 N 0.36 7.15 1.14 0.41 0.17 -3.90 0.07 N 0.41 6.44 0.80 0.55 0.18 -10.08 0.05 N 0.33
13.7 -2.2 9.4 0.6 -13.4 4.1 19.6 8.5 0.0 9.6 -3.4 -8.8 6.2 47.5 5.0 -3.2 10.4 1.0 -12.9 5.1 19.6
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~DGLS, original data~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~DGLS, factor scores~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~DGLS, mean centred~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
 
 
 
Note: (1) Highlighted estimates indicate statistical significance at 5% (2) Italicized figures are the values for the associated relevant test statistics (3) # indicates statistical significance at 10% 
Table A1: Results from unit root tests on common factor and error 
 
Sample coverage
Xit 
defined 
on:
Variation in Xit 
explained by common 
factor (%)
ADF on 
common factor
ADF 
on 
error
DFGLS on 
common factor Comment
z(t) z(t) Test statistic
Major states, 1980-2006 PCY 26.3 -8.9 -9.2 -9.1 C
Major states, 1980-2006 PCSER 46 -5.4 -5.6 -5.6 C
Major states, 1990-2006 PCY 33.7 -4.9 -5.1 -5.5 C
Major states, 1990-2006 PCSER 61 -4.0 -4.2 -4.3 C  
 
Note: (1) Optimal lag length from Ng-Perron for all tests was 0 (2) 'C' stands for convergence (3) ADF critical values for all 
samples at 1, 5 and 10% were -3.75, -3.0 and -2.63, respectively (4) DFGLS critical values at 1, 5 and 10% were: -3.77, -
3.45 and -3.1 for major states over 1980-2006; and -3.77, -3.64 and -3.2 over 1990-2006. 
 
 
Table A2: Results from Breitung & Das (2005) panel unit root tests 
 
Series λ* p-value λ* p-value
lpcser 1.4 0.92 -0.06 0.48
lpcintdd 1.6 0.95 0.24 0.6
lpcextdd 1.5 0.93 1.36 0.9
llib -1.4 0.086 0.26 0.6
lurb -0.33 0.37 -1.14 0.13
Without trend With trend
 
 
Note: The test was conducted with a lag length of 5 for all series.
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 Table A3: Results from ADF unit root tests 
 
Variables AP BH GJ GO HP HR KN KR MH MP OR PJ RJ TN UP WB
LPCSER I(1)* I(1)*** I(1)*** I(1)*** I(1)** I(1)*** I(1)** I(1)*** I(1)*** I(1)*** I(1)*** I(1)** I(1)*** I(1)*** I(1)*** I(2)***
LPCINTDD(-1) I(0)* I(1)*** I(0)* I(1)** I(1)** I(1)*** I(1)*** I(1)*** I(1)*** I(1)*** I(0)* I(0)* I(1)*** I(1)*** I(1)*** I(1)***
LPCEXTDD(-1) I(1)*** I(2)*** I(1)* I(2)*** I(2)*** I(1)*** I(1)*** I(1)*** I(1)*** I(1)*** I(1)*** I(1)*** I(1)*** I(1)*** I(0)* I(1)***
LPCNEIGHDD(-1) I(0)** I(1)*** I(1)*** I(1)*** I(0)*** I(1)*** I(0)** I(1)*** I(1)*** I(1)** I(1)*** I(0)* I(1)*** I(1)*** I(1)*** I(1)***
LPCRESTDD(-1) I(1)* I(1)*** I(1)*** I(2)*** I(1)*** I(1)*** I(1)*** I(0)*** I(1)*** I(1)*** I(1)*** I(1)*** I(1)*** I(1)*** I(0)**
LLIB I(1)*** I(0)** I(0)** I(1)*** I(0)*** I(0)** I(0)*** I(0)* I(1)*** I(1)*** I(0)* I(1)*** I(0)* I(0)**
LURB I(0)** I(2)*** I(1)*** I(1)*** I(1)*** I(1)* I(0)** I(1)*** I(0)** I(0)** I(2)*** I(1)* I(2)*** I(1)* I(1)***  
 
Note: *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% levels of significance, respectively.  
 
Table A4: Results from Johansen-Juselius (J-J) Cointegration Tests
 
No. of cointegrating equations AP BH GJ HR KN KR MH MP OR PJ RJ TN UP WB
J-J TEST (Trace)# 6** 4** 5** 4** 3** 4** 4** 3** 3** 3** 4** 5** 4** 6**
J-J TEST (Trace)## 5* 3* 4* 3* 3* 3* 3* 2* 3* 3* 3* 4* 4* 4*
J-J TEST (Max eigenvalue)# 6** 3** 5** 2** 2** 2** 4** 2** 3** 3** 4** 5** 4** 3**
J-J TEST (Max eigenvalue)## 3* 2* 2* 2* 2* 2* 3* 2* 3* 3* 3* 4* 2* 2*  
Note: (1) * and ** indicate 10% and 5% levels of significance, respectively (2) # indicates primary regression (equation 1); ## indicates secondary regression (equation 2) 
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